What impact is the Sino-US trade war likely to have on the chip industry

The impact of the Sino-US trade war on the chip industry is complex and far-reaching, involving technology, supply chain, market pattern and other levels, the following is the analysis of the main impact:

1. Supply chain disruption and reorganization
Import restrictions and supply risks: US export controls on China (such as high-end chips and manufacturing equipment) directly threaten the supply chain security of Chinese enterprises.
Acceleration of localization: China promotes "domestic substitution" and increases investment in local chip manufacturing (such as SMIC, Yangtze River Storage) and key equipment (such as micro Semiconductor), but it is difficult to break through advanced processes below 7nm in the short term.
Global division of labor adjustment: multinational enterprises seek to diversify their supply chains, such as Samsung and TSMC to build factories in the United States, while China attracts overseas packaging and testing (such as Malaysia and Vietnam) links to reduce risks.
2. Technology blockade and innovation competition
Key technology bottlenecks: the United States restricts EDA tools (such as Cadence, Synopsys), lithography machine (ASML EUV) exports to China, delaying China's advanced process research and development. For example, SMIC had difficulty obtaining EUV lithography machines, and 7nm mass production was blocked.
Reverse innovation pressure: China increases R&D investment (such as the third phase of the National Grand Fund), but faces patent barriers and ecological disadvantages (such as dependence on ARM architecture). Huawei Hongmeng and Shengteng chips are breakthrough attempts, but ecological construction still takes time.
International cooperation turns: China strengthens technical cooperation with Europe (such as IMEC), Japan and South Korea (such as Rapidus), bypassing U.S. restrictions, but the core links are still subject to U.S. technology ratio rules.
3. Market differentiation and competition pattern
Sino-us market segmentation: China accelerates import substitution, the self-sufficiency rate of domestic chips is about 30% in 2023 (the target is 70% in 2025), and the share of US companies (such as Qualcomm and Intel) in China has declined. For example, China's 5G base stations have basically adopted domestic chips.
Global market volatility: chip prices are severely affected by the trade war and capacity allocation (such as the shortage of car gauge chips), and foundries such as TSMC are forced to take sides, exacerbating industry uncertainty.
Competition in emerging areas: AI chips (such as Nvidia A100 to Huawei), autonomous driving (such as Horizon to Mobileye) have become new battlefields, and the United States has restricted high-end GPU exports to force China's own solutions.
4. Escalation of investment and policy intervention
Government capital injection: China has supported local companies through large funds (more than 300 billion yuan has been invested) and tax incentives, but some projects have been exposed to risks due to lagging technology or corruption (such as the bankruptcy of Unigroup).
Us policy counterattack: The Chip and Science Act subsidizes 52.7 billion US dollars to attract manufacturing back, requiring companies to not expand production in China for ten years, and TSMC Arizona plant faces cost and cultural challenges.
Europe and Japan and South Korea choose sides: the EU launched the "chip Bill" to strengthen local production capacity, South Korea is in the gap to save (Samsung's factory in China to adjust production capacity), Japan restricts the export of photoresist with the United States.
5. Long-term geopolitical implications
Technology standards split: 5G, AI and other fields may appear Sino-US led dual-track standards, such as China's push RISC-V architecture against ARM/X86.
Limited talent flow: The United States restricts Chinese student visas in STEM fields, affecting the pool of high-end talent, but China accelerates the introduction of overseas experts through the "Thousand talents Plan".
Regional supply chain formation: North America (US, Canada and Mexico), Asia (China, Japan and South Korea), Europe three major chip clusters gradually took shape, global efficiency decreased but anti-risk ability improved.
Future trend outlook
Short-term pain continues: China is gradually achieving self-sufficiency in mature processes (above 28nm), but the situation of relying on imports for advanced processes (below 5nm) may last 5-10 years.
Innovation mode transformation: Chinese enterprises shift from "reverse engineering" to basic research and development (such as Huawei Hisilicon self-developed architecture), but need to break through patent containment.
Global cooperation and confrontation coexist: China and the United States may compromise in the low-end chip market, but the high-end technology competition is fierce, and third countries (such as India, the Middle East) may become a new game point.